18740
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If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
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Full Idea:
If there is indeed no property of existence that is expressed by the word 'exist', then it makes no sense to ask for its essence.
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From:
Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
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A reaction:
As far as I can tell, this was exactly Aristotle's conclusion, so he skirted round the question of 'being qua being', and focused on the nature of objects instead. Grand continental talk of 'Being' doesn't sound very interesting.
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16115
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Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Change is the actuality of that which exists potentially, in so far as it is potentially this actuality. Thus, the actuality of a thing's capacity for alteration, in so far as it is a capacity for alteration, is alteration.
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From:
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 201a10)
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A reaction:
Not very informative, until you add Idea 16114, telling us that potentiality is best seen as 'power'. Then we have 'all change is the active expression of powers', which strikes me as rather interesting.
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17262
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Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
Aristotle's distinction between four different kinds of aitia ('becauses'?) arguably involves the recognition of grounding in the formal and material aitia.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 198a24) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2
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A reaction:
Insofar as the other two (efficient and final) involve explanation, one might say that they too involve a different sort of grounding. Is a statue 'grounded' in the sculptor, or in the purpose of the statue?
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