Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mathematical Methods in Philosophy', 'On What There Is' and 'Goodbye Descartes'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
18740 If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew]
     Full Idea: If there is indeed no property of existence that is expressed by the word 'exist', then it makes no sense to ask for its essence.
     From: Horsten,L/Pettigrew,R (Mathematical Methods in Philosophy [2014], 2)
     A reaction: As far as I can tell, this was exactly Aristotle's conclusion, so he skirted round the question of 'being qua being', and focused on the nature of objects instead. Grand continental talk of 'Being' doesn't sound very interesting.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
10241 For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Quine takes 'existence' to be univocal, with a single ontology for his entire 'web of belief'.
     From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
     A reaction: Thus, there can be no 'different way of existing' (such as 'subsisting') for abstract objects such as those of mathematics. I presume that Quine's low-key physicalism is behind this.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
4064 The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
     Full Idea: According to Quine's conception of existence, the idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin.
     From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Tim Crane - Elements of Mind 1.5
     A reaction: I suspect that Quine's ontology is too dependent on language, but this thought seems profoundly right
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19277 Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
     Full Idea: It is because Quine holds constant singular terms to be always eliminable by an extension of Russell's theory of definite descriptions that he takes the bound variables of first-order quantification to be the sole means by which we refer to objects.
     From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Bob Hale - Necessary Beings 01.2
     A reaction: Hale defends a Fregean commitment to existence based on the reference of singular terms in true statements. I think they're both wrong. If you want to know what I am committed to, ask me. Don't infer it from my use of English, or logic.