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3 ideas
| 2349 | Realists believe truth is correspondence, independent of humans, is bivalent, and is unique [Putnam] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysical realism about truth is a bundle of ideas: that it is a matter of Correspondence, that it exhibits Independence (of humans), Bivalence, and Uniqueness (there is only one ultimate truth). | |
| From: Hilary Putnam (Representation and Reality [1988], §7 p.107) |
| 16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of ontological commitment becomes a central element in a theory of ontology if one merely adds that a particular theory is, in fact, true | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: Helpful. I don't think the truth of a theory entails the actual existence of every component mentioned in the theory, as some of them may be generalisations, abstractions, vague, or even convenient linking fictions. |
| 16259 | Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
| Full Idea: Naïve translation from natural language into formal language can obscure necessary ontology as easily as it can create superfluous ontological commitment. …The lion's share of metaphysical work is done when settling on the right translation. | |
| From: Tim Maudlin (The Metaphysics within Physics [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: I suspect this is more than a mere problem of 'naivety', but may be endemic to the whole enterprise. If you hammer a square peg into a round hole, you expect to lose something. Language is subtle, logic is crude. |