Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Elm and the Expert', 'Causal Powers' and 'Treatise of Human Nature'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence

21291	There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume]
	Full Idea: Betwixt unity and number there can be no medium; no more than betwixt existence and non-existence.
	From: David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.IV.2)
	A reaction: Just to confirm that, as you would expect, the great empiricist has no time for 'subsistence', or shadows and holes having lower grade existece.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change

15261	Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: Given the Humean ontology, there is grave difficulty in making any sense at all of the concept of change with continuity as distinct from successive replacements.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6. Intro)
	A reaction: Hence the four-dimensionalist approach is basically Hume updated. The weird nature of time lurks behind this difficulty. If you can separate the moments of time, you can separate the bits of a continuous thing, and then ask how they relate.

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive

15268	Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: On our view, 'event' is to be understood in terms of the ontology of enduring things, while on the Humean view enduring things are conceived to be constructions of events.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
	A reaction: It has quite hard to take either objects or events, given that they seem to be amenable to analysis. I am tempted to take essences as primitive. They fix identity, endure change, bear accidental properties (including temporary intrinsics).

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events

15257	The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: By a shift from events to things we claim to make the big problem of induction tractable.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.II)
	A reaction: [You'll have to read their chapter to get the whole picture] The idea of basing a metaphysics on 'events' gives me the creeps, given the difficulty of individuating an event. Events are not primitive; even animals can analyse their components.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality

15300	Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: Fundamental particulars are incapable of change.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.IV)
	A reaction: I quote this in order to challenge it. If the proton can decay (which seems to be the case) maybe everything can. The fundamentals of a lawn mower eventually rust away; it may be thus with universe. What evidence could deny this?

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff

15319	Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: There is no metaphysical justification whatever for treating the solid, bounded, material object as the determiner of all thing concepts. Fluids are no less material things than are hard solid blocks.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV)
	A reaction: We don't tend to talk of a fluid as 'a' thing, and without distinct objects there would be virtually no structure, or interest, in nature, so what gives identity to the blocks must interest the metaphysician.

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures

15320	Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: The magnetic and the gravitation field can occupy all the same places without merging.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV)
	A reaction: We can divide stuff into two classes, then, according to whether they usually merge if coextensive in space. Oil and water can be mixed, but eventually separate again.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism

15318	Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: The region around a magnetic body, the space between earth and moon, and the vicinity of an electric cable remain obstinately and, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III)
	A reaction: Ouch, if you are a strict 'materialist'! I call myself a 'naturalist', in a hand-wavy sort of way. On materialism and determinism I remain vague.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs

15267	Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden]
	Full Idea: A state of affairs consists of structures of particulars that endure (of which physical objects would be one type), the properties and powers of those particulars, and the relations obtaining among them. A common 'event' is a change in state of affairs.
	From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
	A reaction: I find 'event' to be so vague, and so dependent on pragmatic interests, that it has hard to find a place for it in an ontological system. Ditto with state of affairs. They overlap. States of affairs can survive change (like a political majority).