Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Events and Their Names', 'Categories' and 'Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects'

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11 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: I have the gravest doubts whether any coherent account could be given of any multiplicity of senses of 'exist'.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 2.x)
     A reaction: I thoroughly agree with this thought. Do water and wind exist in different senses of 'exist'?
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: He criticises his 'Categories' view, because if primary being is simply the ultimate subject of predication the primary being is, in virtue of itself, something indeterminate; it would be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for primary being.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Vassilis Politis - Aristotle and the Metaphysics 7.5
     A reaction: Thus, Politis argues, primary being is essence in the later work. The words 'substance' and 'ousia' cause confusion here, and must be watched closely. Wedin argues that Aristotle merely develops his 'Categories' view, but most disagree.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place. A change in our affections would be an example of alteration.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 15a13)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
     Full Idea: Events are not basic items in the universe; they should not be included in any fundamental ontology...all the truths about them are entailed by and explained and made true by truths that do not involve the event concept.
     From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.12), quoted by Peter Simons - Events 3.1
     A reaction: Given the variable time spans of events, their ability to coincide, their ability to contain no motion, their blatantly conventional component, and their recalcitrance to individuation, I say Bennett is right.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: That from which the implication of existence does not hold reciprocally is thought to be prior.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14a32)
     A reaction: shadows and objects
Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: For of things which reciprocate as to implication of existence, that which is in some way the cause of the other's existence might reasonably by called prior by nature.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 14b12)
     A reaction: Not so clear when you seek examples. The bus is prior to its redness, but you can't have a colourless bus, so being coloured is prior to being a bus. Aristotle's example is a man being prior to the truths about him.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
     Full Idea: When a class of terms functions as singular terms, and the sentences are true, then those terms genuinely refer. Being singular terms, their reference is to objects. There is no further question whether they really refer, and there are such objects.
     From: Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983], 1.iii)
     A reaction: This seems to be a key sentence, because this whole view is standardly called 'platonic', but it certainly isn't platonism as we know it, Jim. Ontology has become an entirely linguistic matter, but do we then have 'sakes' and 'whereaboutses'?
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's list of ten categories proved to be the most influential scheme found in his works: Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, Time, Being-in-a-position, Having, Doing, Being affected.
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01
The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelian schedule of categories - substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time, and so forth - appears to peter out inconsequentially.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.7
     A reaction: Compare Idea 5544 for Kant's attempt to classify categories. Personally I like the way Aristotle's 'peter out'. That seems to me a more plausible character for good metaphysics.
There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected.
     From: Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 01b25)
     A reaction: This sums up the earlier of Aristotle's two metaphysical view, and each of this categories is discussed in the present text.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
     Full Idea: Aristotle seems to have worked out his list of categories by considering various questions that one might ask about a particular object, such as What is it? How big is it? How is it qualified? And Where is it?
     From: report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance
     A reaction: Of course, to think of his questions, Aristotle already had categories in his mind. How would he approach a proposal to recategorise reality more efficiently?