Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On What Grounds What', 'Atomism' and 'The Possibility of Metaphysics'

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19 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One could argue that some abstract objects exist in all possible worlds (e.g. natural numbers) and that abstract objects always depend for their existence upon concrete objects, and conclude that some concrete objects exist in all possible worlds.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.1)
     A reaction: We're all in the dark on this one, but I quite like this argument. I can't conceive of a reality that lacks natural numbers, and the truths that accompany them, and I personally think that numbers arise from the patterns of physical reality.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
     Full Idea: For some metaphysicians, possession of causal power is the very hallmark of real existence (and is one reason, for instance, why some have denied the existence of the void or absolute space).
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2)
     A reaction: You could try saying that space has the power of making movement possible. The 'hallmark' of something doesn't define what it is. Existence without causal power seems logically possible and imaginable, but unlikely. Epiphenomena have this problem.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The extreme views on change are the Heraclitan view - that every change brings into existence an entirely new entity, and destroys what existed before, and the Spinozan view - that all changes are phase changes within a single substance.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2)
     A reaction: The views in between are that bundles of properties shift their contents, or that many substances undergo changes in their properties. The unification of physics might be aiming to vindicate Spinoza. Temporal parts (Lewis) are close to Heraclitus.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
     Full Idea: My own broadly Aristotelian view is that events are changes (and unchanges) in the properties and relations of persisting objects.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 4.4)
     A reaction: This needs an account of what it is that persists, and the philosophers' (but not physicists') concept of 'substance' fills this role. It is rather hard to give identity-conditions for an event if it is an 'unchange'. How would you count such events?
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
     Full Idea: We must include events in our ontology because they figure indispensably in singular causal explanations.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.5)
     A reaction: Hm. Spirits figure indispensably in supernatural explanations. It would be quite a task to prove that events really are indispensable to causal explanations. Why would nomological or counterfactual causal explanations not have the same need?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Grounding should be taken as primitive, as per the neo-Aristotelian approach. Grounding is an unanalyzable but needed notion - it is the primitive structuring conception of metaphysics.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2)
     A reaction: [he cites K.Fine 1991] I find that this simple claim clarifies the discussions of Kit Fine, where you are not always quite sure what the game is. I agree fully with it. It makes metaphysics interesting, where cataloguing entities is boring.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Supervenience is mere modal correlation.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: My preferred view is that there is only one fundamental entity - the whole concrete cosmos - from which all else exists by abstraction.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1)
     A reaction: This looks to me like weak anti-realism - that there are no natural 'joints' in nature - but I don't think Schaffer intends that. I take the joints to be fundamentals, which necessitates that the cosmos has parts. His 'abstraction' is clearly a process.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Philosophers who invoke facts are divided over whether facts are wholly abstract entities or are complexes capable of containing concrete objects as constituents.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2)
     A reaction: If externalism about concepts was true (see Thought|Content|Broad Content), this would support the second (more concrete) view of facts. The correspondence theory of truth would love to plug belief into the concrete world. Me too.
Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
     Full Idea: There is a difficulty for any view of facts which sees them as being wholly abstract entities, and yet also being causal relata; for it seems that only concrete entities, existing in time and space, can enter into causal relations.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.3)
     A reaction: There seems a lot of ambiguity in the air here, between epistemology and ontology (surprise!). I take causation to be a physical activity in the concrete world. Our understanding of it is expressed with abstractions. 'Fact' seems to have two meanings.
The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
     Full Idea: The most notorious problem besetting the view that facts are structured complexes of constituents is the question of what it is that binds the supposed constituents into the fact. The ordered triple doesn't make Mars red.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.5)
     A reaction: Lowe denies that facts are complex entities on this basis. You only have the problem if Mars and its redness are two 'things'. If redness is intrinsically a dependent item, we may escape. I wish they wouldn't use colours as examples. See Idea 5456.
It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Although 'fact' is grammatically a count noun, it strikes us as being at best whimsical to talk about enumerating facts - to talk, for instance, about how many facts I learned today before breakfast.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 12.4)
     A reaction: I always liked the question 'how many facts are there in this room?' One might make a serious attempt to decide how many facts I learned before breakfast, and reach a reasonable approximation, especially if one didn't open the newspaper.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Facts seem to be indispensable as truth-makers and perhaps as causal relata, ..but if we must only include in our ontology things for which we can state a criterion of identity (Quine), ..we seem to be faced with a dilemma.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11)
     A reaction: Lowe proposes to relax the identification requirement (see Idea 8312). This seems a good strategy. An awful lot of strange philosophy arises from insisting on strict conditions for our understanding, and then finding everywhere failure to achieve it.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One of the chief rivals to my own substance-based ontology is the view that holds facts or states of affairs to be the building-blocks of the world.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], Pref)
     A reaction: I think I side with Lowe, even though I am uneasy about the gap between the philosopher's 'substance' and the basic entities of physics. Facts are hard to individuate, and seem to be composed of more basic elements.
Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some abstract objects, notably certain universals, need to be invoked for explanatory purposes, even if it cannot be said that they themselves possess causal powers or enter into causal relations.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 10.2)
     A reaction: I am unconvinced that an entity with no causal powers could be any kind of explanation, given that, by definition, it can't do anything. You would have to think that the world of pure reason functioned without the aid of causal powers.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Ontological categories should not be confused with natural kinds: for natural kinds can only be differentiated in a principled way relative to an accepted framework of ontological categories.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.2)
     A reaction: I presume that the natural kinds are likely to be contingent facts about the actual world (though they may entail necessary laws), whereas I like to think, unfashionably, that categories aim at deconstructing the mind of God (roughly).
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some metaphysicians take the highest division to be between abstract and concrete entities, others take it to be between universals and particulars (my own preference, though it is not crucial), and others between necessary and contingent entities.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 8.3)
     A reaction: The first division may be blurred, and I am doubtful about universals, so I favour the third. Intuition tells me that there is nothing more basic than the distinction between what is true in all worlds and what is only true in some. The former is bedrock.
Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]
     Full Idea: Lowe's Ontological Categories: ENTITIES - {Universals - [Kinds - (Non-natural)(Natural)] [Properties, Relations]} {Particulars - [Abstracta - (Sets)(others)] [Concreta - (Objects)(Non-Objects)]} etc
     From: report of E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], p.181) by Jan Westerhoff - Ontological Categories §01
     A reaction: [my linear representation of a tree diagram; bracket-styles show levels] Lowe's levels below these divide according to whether things are 'substances' or not. I've heard Kit Fine tease Lowe for being too simplistic about ontology.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Maybe the categories are determined by the different grounding relations, ..so that categories just are the ways things depend on substances. ...Categories are places in the dependence ordering.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 1.3)