display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
| 13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Grounding should be taken as primitive, as per the neo-Aristotelian approach. Grounding is an unanalyzable but needed notion - it is the primitive structuring conception of metaphysics. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2) | |
| A reaction: [he cites K.Fine 1991] I find that this simple claim clarifies the discussions of Kit Fine, where you are not always quite sure what the game is. I agree fully with it. It makes metaphysics interesting, where cataloguing entities is boring. |
| 13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Supervenience is mere modal correlation. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.2) |
| 13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: My preferred view is that there is only one fundamental entity - the whole concrete cosmos - from which all else exists by abstraction. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: This looks to me like weak anti-realism - that there are no natural 'joints' in nature - but I don't think Schaffer intends that. I take the joints to be fundamentals, which necessitates that the cosmos has parts. His 'abstraction' is clearly a process. |
| 5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The space of science is neutral as between touch and sight; thus it cannot be either the space of touch or the space of sight. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: I find this persuasive, although it is hardly a knock-down argument. It is a very simple problem for anti-realists, that if you say reality IS sensations (à la Berkeley), then you have conflicting sensations of what seems to be one reality. |
| 5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If we imagine a world of mere matter, there would be no room for falsehood, and although it would contain what may be called 'facts', it would not contain any truths. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch.12) | |
| A reaction: Only a realist will buy a concept of mind-independent 'facts', but I am with Russell all the way here. We should not say "the truth is out there", but "the facts are out there". Facts are the target of thought, and truth is a relationship to the facts. |
| 13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
| Full Idea: Maybe the categories are determined by the different grounding relations, ..so that categories just are the ways things depend on substances. ...Categories are places in the dependence ordering. | |
| From: Jonathan Schaffer (On What Grounds What [2009], 1.3) |