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4 ideas
8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
Full Idea: Affirmation of existence is nothing but denial of the number nought. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §53) | |
A reaction: Mathematicians - don't you luv 'em. No doubt this is helpful in placing existence within the great network of logical inferences, but his 'nothing but' is laughable. I don't see much existential anguish in the denial of zero. |
21982 | I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L] |
Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people." | |
From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7 | |
A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork. |
8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
Full Idea: Frege's identification of the abstract with the realm of non-mental things entails that unobservables such as quarks are abstract. The abstract nature of chess, and the possibility of abstracta in the mind of God, show they can be mind-dependent. | |
From: comment on Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Gideon Rosen - Abstract Objects 'Way of Neg' | |
A reaction: I like the robust question 'if a is said to 'exist', what is it said to be made of?' I consider the views of Frege to have had too much influence in this area, and recognising the role of the mind (psychology!) in abstraction is a start. |
8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
Full Idea: We speak of the equator as an imaginary line, but it is not a fictitious line; it is not a creature of thought, the product of a psychological process, but is only recognised or apprehended by thought. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §26) | |
A reaction: Nice point. The same goes for the apparently very abstract and theoretical concept of a 'circle', because a perfect circle could be imagined in a very specific location, perhaps passing through three specified points. |