Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Of the First Principles of Government' and 'On What There Is'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Quine takes 'existence' to be univocal, with a single ontology for his entire 'web of belief'.
     From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.9
     A reaction: Thus, there can be no 'different way of existing' (such as 'subsisting') for abstract objects such as those of mathematics. I presume that Quine's low-key physicalism is behind this.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
     Full Idea: According to Quine's conception of existence, the idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin.
     From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Tim Crane - Elements of Mind 1.5
     A reaction: I suspect that Quine's ontology is too dependent on language, but this thought seems profoundly right
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
     Full Idea: It is because Quine holds constant singular terms to be always eliminable by an extension of Russell's theory of definite descriptions that he takes the bound variables of first-order quantification to be the sole means by which we refer to objects.
     From: report of Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948]) by Bob Hale - Necessary Beings 01.2
     A reaction: Hale defends a Fregean commitment to existence based on the reference of singular terms in true statements. I think they're both wrong. If you want to know what I am committed to, ask me. Don't infer it from my use of English, or logic.