Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Through the Looking Glass', 'Frege philosophy of mathematics' and 'fragments/reports'

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3 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
I only wish I had such eyes as to see Nobody! It's as much as I can do to see real people. [Carroll,L]
     Full Idea: "I see nobody on the road," said Alice. - "I only wish I had such eyes," the King remarked. ..."To be able to see Nobody! ...Why, it's as much as I can do to see real people."
     From: Lewis Carroll (C.Dodgson) (Through the Looking Glass [1886], p.189), quoted by A.W. Moore - The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics 07.7
     A reaction: [Moore quotes this, inevitably, in a chapter on Hegel] This may be a better candidate for the birth of philosophy of language than Frege's Groundwork.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The distinction between concrete and abstract objects, or Frege's corresponding distinction between actual and non-actual objects, is not a sharp dichotomy, but resembles a scale upon which objects occupy a range of positions.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.18)
     A reaction: This might seem right if you live (as Dummett chooses to) in the fog of language, but it surely can't be right if you think about reality. Is the Equator supposed to be near the middle of his scale? Either there is an equator, or there isn't.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett]
     Full Idea: Fully fledged realism depends on - indeed, may be identified with - an undiluted application to sentences of the relevant kind of straightforwards two-valued semantics.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.15)
     A reaction: This is the sort of account you get from a whole-heartedly linguistic philosopher. Personally I would say that Dummett has got it precisely the wrong way round: I adopt a two-valued semantics because my metaphysics is realist.