display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
Full Idea: In order to know which event has been ostensively identified by a speaker, the auditor must know the limits intended by the speaker. ...Events do not have natural boundaries. | |
From: M.R. Ayers (Individuals without Sortals [1974], 'Concl') | |
A reaction: He distinguishes events thus from natural objects, where the world, to a large extent, offers us the boundaries. Nice point. |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
Full Idea: I find at least five different senses of "reduction" in the literature - ontological (genes/DNA), property ontological (heat/mean molecular energy), theoretical (gas laws/statistics), logical/definitional (average plumber), and causal (solids/molecules). | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.II) | |
A reaction: A useful pointer towards some much needed clearer thought about reduction. It is necessary to cross reference this list against reductions which are either ontological or epistemological or linguistic. |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
Full Idea: Searle's defence of causally efficacious supervenient mind won't work, because, unlike the mind, the solidity of a piston is not a distinct and separate phenomenon from its microstructure. | |
From: comment on John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.V) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.6 | |
A reaction: Searle struggles to find analogies for his position - and that, in my view, is highly significant in the philosophy of mind. If there is nothing else like your proposed theory, it is probably just human vainglory. |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
Full Idea: For Searle the supervenience relation is just causality. | |
From: report of John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 5.V) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.6 | |
A reaction: 'Supervenience' seems, in that case, to be an irrelevant word, which was only used when the mind-body connection was a bit loose and mysterious. Mind is identical to brain, or a property of the brain. I like 'process of the brain'. |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
Full Idea: One can accept the obvious facts of physics, that the world consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force. | |
From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Intro) | |
A reaction: I agree with this proposal, with the cautious proviso that physics may discover further basic aspects to reality. The only obstacles to this view are possible divine and mental substances, neither of which is supported by adequate evidence. |