display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
Full Idea: We have, I think, shown the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. | |
From: George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], Intro §21) | |
A reaction: He achieves this by an attack on universals, offering the nominalist view that there are only particulars. There seems to be a middle ground, where universals don't actually exist, but there are settled conventional abstraction, beyond particulars. |
8198 | A 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east' [Dummett] |
Full Idea: The idea of 'Cambridge Change' is like saying 'the landscape changes as you travel east'. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 5) | |
A reaction: The phrase was coined in Oxford. It is a useful label with which realists can insult solipsists, idealists and other riff-raff. Four Dimensionalists seem to see time in this way. Events sit there, and we travel past them. But there are indexical events. |
18876 | Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron] |
Full Idea: I think that we should consider Berkeley as believing in trees; we should simply claim that he has false beliefs about what trees are. | |
From: report of George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710]) by Ross P. Cameron - Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology 'Realism' | |
A reaction: I can be realist about spots before my eyes, or a ringing in my ears, but be (quite sensibly) unsure about what they are, so Cameron's suggestion sounds plausible. |
8192 | I no longer think what a statement about the past says is just what can justify it [Dummett] |
Full Idea: In distinguishing between what can establish a statement about the past as true and what it is that that statement says, we are repudiating antirealism about the past. | |
From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 3) | |
A reaction: This is a late shift of ground from the champion of antirealism. If Dummett's whole position is based on a 'justificationist' theory of meaning, he must surely have a different theory of meaning now for statements about the past? |