display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
Full Idea: If one says that 'everything that exists is causally active', that rules out abstracta (notably sets and numbers), and it rules out objects that are causally isolated. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I like the principle. I take abstracta to be brain events, so they are causally active, within highly refined and focused brains, and if your physics is built on the notion of fields then I would think a 'causally isolated' object incoherent. |
15540 | You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis] |
Full Idea: To say that properties are really relations to times is to treat temporary intrinsics (such as my changing shape) as a matter of relations, but then 'intrinsic properties' would not deserve the name, and it is untenable if it denies temporary intrinsics. | |
From: David Lewis (Rearrangement of Particles [1988], 1) | |
A reaction: [I have compressed a paragraph; he refers to his 1986:204] If a property is meant to be a 'relation to a time', I am not sure what the relata are meant to be, and I agree with Lewis that this seems a long way from properties. |
9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
Full Idea: If one's naturalistic principles are formulated in terms of supervenience, then necessary entities are left untouched. | |
From: Alexander Bird (Nature's Metaphysics [2007], 5.5) | |
A reaction: I take this to be part of the reason why some people like supervenience - that it leaves a pure 'space of reasons' which is unreachable from the flesh and blood inside a cranium. Personall I like the space of reasons, but I drop the 'pure'. |