Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Potentiality' and 'Things qua Truthmakers'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
19034 The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter]
     Full Idea: We can think of the world as a 'whole' that has everything as its parts, like raisins in a cake, or we can think of the world as a 'container', which is disjoint from everything there is, like a bottle containing water.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 7.3)
     A reaction: [compressed] Space and time seem to have a special role here, and it is hard to think of any other candidates for being the 'container'. I think I will apply my 'what's it made of' test to ontology, and opt for the world as a 'whole'.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
14401 Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Every proposition, no matter what subject matter it may have, is entirely about being.
     From: David Lewis (Things qua Truthmakers [2003], p.26), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology 4.VI
     A reaction: Since Lewis's propositions are sets of possible worlds, I presume this claim is made because proposition relates to all of the possible worlds, which therefore presumably embody Being.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
19015 Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter]
     Full Idea: 'Relational' grounding is between entities, best expressed by the two-place predicate 'x grounds y'. 'Operational' grounding is between sentences, best expressed by the two-place sentence operator read as 'because of' or 'in virtue of'.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.6)
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
19012 The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter]
     Full Idea: Humean supervenience excludes modality - the whole modal package - from the supervenience base. The Humean world is, at root, thoroughly non-modal.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 1.2)
     A reaction: This sums up my problem with David Lewis with perfect clarity. He is just excessively empirical. Hume himself also excluded modality from the basic impressions. Locke allows powerful essences (even if they are well hidden).