display all the ideas for this combination of texts
11 ideas
| 7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| Full Idea: The 'Tractatus' is an uncompromising, indeed an extreme, example of 'Logical Atomism' | |
| From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: Russell talked about his 'logical atomism' after 1918, but this reminds us that Wittgenstein was fulfilling a task set for him by Russell. Wittgenstein's atoms are names-plus-objects, Russell's are demonstratives-plus-sensedata. |
| 23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: In an atomic fact [Sachverhalt] the objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.03), quoted by Homer - The Iliad | |
| A reaction: So the world consists of facts, but the facts are composed of objects. The point seems to be that the truths of language refer to the facts, rather than to the objects. Objects 'don't hang' together in the fact of a chance encounter. |
| 23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact. …The form is the possibility of the structure. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.032-3) | |
| A reaction: I very much like the way LW adds a modal dimension to his ontology. Why doesn't he talk of 'relations', rather than 'hanging together'? |
| 21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary that there can be no elementary proposition contradicting it. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.211) | |
| A reaction: It is a hallmark of atomic atoms that they have no relations with other atoms, but are wholly independent. This obviously invites the question of how they are united. Are logical connectives intrinsically relational logical atoms? |
| 22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.221), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 50 'Indep' | |
| A reaction: Not clear about 'combinations of names'. Does that include predicates? How do you combine two names? |
| 21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: From an elementary proposition no other can be inferred. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.134) | |
| A reaction: Russell was not so sure. This is the sort of remark that elicits from me the question that extravagent metaphysics also provokes - 'how on earth does he know what he claims to be true?'. |
| 10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The 'concrete/abstract' distinction has a strong intuitive feel, and can seem to be drawable by familiar contrasts, between what can/cannot be perceived, what can/cannot be involved in causal interactions, and is/is not located in space and time. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.I) | |
| A reaction: Problems arise, needless to say. The idea of an abstraction can be causal, and abstractions seem to change. If universals are abstract, we seem to perceive some of them. They can hardly be non-spatial if they have a temporal beginning and end. |
| 10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: It might seem that colours would qualify both as concrete and as abstract objects. ...and geometrical points also seem to be borderline. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.II) | |
| A reaction: The theory of tropes exploits this uncertainty. Dummett (1973:ch.14) notes that we can point to colours, but also slip from an adjectival to a noun usage of colour-terms. He concludes that colours are concrete. I think I agree. |
| 10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
| Full Idea: Noonan suggests that the distinction between abstract and concrete objects should be seen as derivative from a difference between the relations centrally involved in criteria of identity associated with names of objects. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Noonan 1976, but I've lost it] I don't understand this, but collect it as a lead to something that might be interesting. A careful reading of Hale might reveal what Noonan meant. |
| 10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
| Full Idea: In familiar, though doubtless not wholly problematic jargon, token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: This is indeed problematic. The marks may be tokens, but the preliminary to identifying the type is to see that the marks are in fact words. To grasp the concrete, grasp the abstraction. An excellent example of the blurring of the distinction. |
| 10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
| Full Idea: The domain of the abstract can be seen as exemplifying a hierarchical structure, with differences of level reflecting the number of steps of abstraction, via appropriate equivalence relations, required for recognition at different levels. | |
| From: Bob Hale (Abstract Objects [1987], Ch.3.III) | |
| A reaction: I think this is right, and so does almost everyone else, since people cheerfully talk of 'somewhat' abstract and 'highly' abstract. Don't dream of a neat picture though. You might reach a level by two steps from one direction, and four from another. |