display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
Full Idea: Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVIII) | |
A reaction: This is the motivation behind Russell's theory of definite descriptions, and epitomises the approach to ontology through language. Sounds wrong to me! |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: I have a great deal of difficulty with an ontology that includes 'stuffs' in addition to things. ...I prefer to replace talk of sameness of matter with talk of sameness of particles. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 14) | |
A reaction: Van Inwagen is wedded to the idea that reality is composed of 'simples' - even if physicists seem now to talk of 'fields' as much as they do about objects in the fields. Has philosophy yet caught up with Maxwell? |
14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
Full Idea: Classes may be regarded as logical fictions, manufactured out of defining characteristics. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], II n1) | |
A reaction: I agree with this. The idea that in addition to the members there is a further object, the set containing them, is absurd. Sets are a tool for thinking about the world. |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
Full Idea: Since singular terms can contain predicates, and since vague predicates are common, vague singular terms are common. For 'the tallest man that Sally knows' there are lots of men for whom it is unclear whether Sally knows them. | |
From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 17) |