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21821
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Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
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From:
report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
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A reaction:
Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
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14493
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Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson]
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Full Idea:
A higher standard for saying that entities exist might require that they play an essential role in explanation, or must figure in any complete causal story, or exist according to some uniform and nonarbitrary principle of composition.
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From:
Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 11.2)
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A reaction:
I am struck by the first of these three. If I am defending the notion that essence depends on Aristotle's account of explanation, then if we add that existence also depends on explanation, we get a criterion for the existence of essences. Yay.
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14491
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Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson]
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Full Idea:
Where there are analytic interrelations among our claims, distinct ontological claims may be true without rivalry, redundancy, or reduction.
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From:
Amie L. Thomasson (Ordinary Objects [2007], 10)
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A reaction:
Thus we might, I suppose, that it is analytically necessary that a lump of clay has a shape, and that a statue be made of something. Interesting.
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