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Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason'' and 'On Female Body Experience'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
     Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
     A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
     Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C]
     Full Idea: If experience shows that some aspect of the physical world fails to instantiate a certain mathematical structure, one will modify the theory by sustituting a different structure, while the original structure doesn't lose its status as part of mathematics.
     From: Charles Parsons (Review of Tait 'Provenance of Pure Reason' [2009], §2)
     A reaction: This seems to be a beautifully simple and powerful objection to the Quinean idea that mathematics somehow only gets its authority from physics. It looked like a daft view to begin with, of course.