Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'On Human Nature' and 'A Subject with No Object'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


8 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
     Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
     A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO]
     Full Idea: When the observer shifts his attention from one level of organisation to the next, as from physics to chemistry, he expects to find obedience to all the laws of the levels below.
     From: Edmund O. Wilson (On Human Nature [1978], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This seems to state a necessary condition of reduction, but not a sufficient one. Wilson points out that new phenomena emerge at higher levels. This principle is similar to Hume's argument against miracles. You don't easily overthrow basic laws.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
     Full Idea: The distinction of abstract and concrete is one of kind and not degree.
     From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], I.A.1.a)
     A reaction: I think I must agree with this. If there is a borderline, it would be in particulars that seem to have an abstract aspect to them. A horse involves the abstraction of being a horse, and it involves be one horse.
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
     Full Idea: Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden'.
     From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.A.1.d)
     A reaction: Not just science. In ordinary conversation we continually refer to particulars using so-called 'universal' predicates and object-terms, which are presumably abstractions. 'I've just seen an elephant'.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
     Full Idea: In mathematics, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, there has been an ascent to higher and higher levels of abstraction.
     From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], II.C.1.b)
     A reaction: I am interested in clarifying what this means, which might involve the common sense and psychological view of the matter, as well as some sort of formal definition in terms of equivalence (or whatever).
Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
     Full Idea: There is a scale of abstractness that leads downwards from sets through attributes to formulas as abstract types and on to formulas as abstract tokens.
     From: JP Burgess / G Rosen (A Subject with No Object [1997], III.B.2.c)
     A reaction: Presumably the 'abstract tokens' at the bottom must have some interpretation, to support the system. Presumably one can keep going upwards, through sets of sets of sets.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
     Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c)