Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'New Essays on Human Understanding' and 'The Essence of Aesthetic'

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7 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
     Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d)
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
     From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
     A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
The idea of being must come from our own existence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I would like to know how we could have the idea of being if we did not, as beings ourselves, find being within us.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 1.01)
     A reaction: I could envisage a creature with an entirely 'externa' mind, that just focused on environment, and took its own place in it unthinkingly for granted. I suppose he's right, though.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Divide terms, objects of ideas, into abstract and concrete, then the abstract into absolute and relational, the absolute into attributes and modifications, and those two into simple and composite; the concrete are substances and their substantial things.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.22)
     A reaction: Make your tree from this: ABSTRACT{absolute[attributes(simple)(composite)][modifications(simple)(composite)],relations}CONCRETE{[substance][substantial form]}
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
     Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.
     From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c)
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The scheme of categories is very useful, and it might be that all that is needed are five general headings for beings - namely substance, quantity, quality, action or passion, and relation - with any formed by composition from those.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.10)
     A reaction: 'Action or passion' as a single category sounds intriguing. He is very keen on active force in the world of physical objects, which presumably falls into this category. His plan sounds, initially, as good as any I have heard.
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It can be said that whatever we truthfully distinguish or compare is also distinguished or made alike by nature, although nature has distinctions and comparisons which are unknown to us and which may be better than ours.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 3.06)
     A reaction: This seems to me to be correct, though it is more like the credo of the sensible realist than it is like any sort of argument.