display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Nominalists tend to deny the existence of abstract objects since, given their purported nature (non-causal), we can have no reason to believe in their existence. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.372) | |
A reaction: A good point. Aristotle worried about the causal inadequacy of the Forms. My mind can conceive of a 'thing' with no causal powers, just sitting there. |
4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
Full Idea: There seem to be three kinds of change: compositional change (of component parts), qualitative change (of properties), or substantial change (when underlying essence begins or ceases). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.59) | |
A reaction: Notice this gives 'components' a more prominent ontological status than usual. Is this computer a component of my study? |
4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
Full Idea: Qualitative change is seen as either (i) 'Presentism' - 'a is F now', or (ii) 'relational properties' - 'a is F-at-t', or (iii) 'temporal parts' - 'a-at-t is F', or (iv) 'adverbial' - 'a is-a-t F'. | |
From: report of E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.44) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The traditional view would let a stay the same over time, and change its property (ii). Lewis favours (iii). My suspicion is that thinking collapses if you abandon the tradtional view. |
4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can plausible coincide in space and time. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.225) | |
A reaction: This is certainly discouraging for anyone who wanted to make events ontologically basic. Physicalist need to be able to individuate events in a reductive way. |
4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes said that modern physics requires us to espouse an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.233) | |
A reaction: It has to be a mistake to build our philosophical ontology on current physics, because even the physicists say they don't understand the latter very well. |
4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.229) | |
A reaction: What exactly would 'exemplify' mean here? This probably turns out to be circular when you attempt to explain what a property is. |
4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
Full Idea: My own preference is for a conception of events which reduces them to changes in the properties of or relations between things. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.245) | |
A reaction: Changes of property and changes of relations are two very different things. Is a 'near miss' an event? If so, is any movement an event? If movement is relative, then so are events. |
4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Some metaphysicians think the fundamental categories of existence are universals and particulars, while other prefer the division between abstract and concrete. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.15) | |
A reaction: Interestingly, in trying to choose between these, it is tempting to think about the capacities of the brain. Which is the cart and which is the horse? |