Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Parmenides', 'Euthydemus' and 'A Structural Account of Mathematics'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts

---

5 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming

229	The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
	Full Idea: The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become.
	From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 155d)

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being

21821	Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
	Full Idea: The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
	From: report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
	A reaction: Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality

221	Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
	Full Idea: The absolute good and the beautiful and all which we conceive to be absolute ideas are unknown to us.
	From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 134c)

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems

9559	If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
	Full Idea: If mathematics shares whatever confirmation accrues to the theories using it, would it not be reasonable to suppose that mathematics shares whatever disconfirmation accrues to the theories using it?
	From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 05.8)
	A reaction: Presumably Quine would bite the bullet here, although maths is much closer to the centre of his web of belief, and so far less likely to require adjustment. In practice, though, mathematics is not challenged whenever an experiment fails.

9566	No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
	Full Idea: Evidently, no scientific explanations of specific phenomena would collapse as a result of any hypothetical discovery that no mathematical objects exist.
	From: Charles Chihara (A Structural Account of Mathematics [2004], 09.1)
	A reaction: It is inconceivable that anyone would challenge this claim. A good model seems to be drama; a play needs commitment from actors and audience, even when we know it is fiction. The point is that mathematics doesn't collapse either.