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324
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Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato]
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Full Idea:
There were, before the world came into existence, being, space, and becoming, three distinct realities.
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From:
Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 52d)
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A reaction:
'Becoming' is the central idea of Heraclitus, and must be what Aristotle calls 'potentiality' [dunamis]. If it was 'before' creation, he should add time to the list. Are these three 'distinct'? Being has potential.
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20364
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The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato]
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Full Idea:
That which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state, but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing, and never really is.
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From:
Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28a)
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A reaction:
Lots of problems with this, of which I take the main one to be the idea that sensation is 'without reason', as if there were a sharp dichotomy in our ways of evaluating reality. Laws of nature seem to be laws of change, not of stasis.
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21821
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Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
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From:
report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
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A reaction:
Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
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