21821
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Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
The Platonic Parmenides is more exact [than Parmenides himself]; the distinction is made between the Primal One, a strictly pure Unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many.
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From:
report of Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE]) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
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A reaction:
Plotinus approves of this three-part theory. Parmenides has the problem that the highest Being contains no movement. By placing the One outside Being you can give it powers which an existent thing cannot have. Cf the concept of God.
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6532
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Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
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Full Idea:
If types cannot be reduced to more physical levels, this is not an embarrassment, as long as our institutional categories, our physiological categories, and our physical categories are just alternative groupings of the same tokens.
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From:
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3)
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A reaction:
This is a self-evident truth about a car engine, so I don't see why it wouldn't apply equally to a brain. Lycan's identification of the type as the thing which cannot be reduced seems a promising explanation of much confusion among philosophers.
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6534
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One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
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Full Idea:
One space-time slice may be occupied by a collection of molecules, a metal strip, a key, an allower of entry to hotel rooms, a facilitator of adultery, and a destroyer souls.
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From:
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3)
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A reaction:
Desdemona's handkerchief is a nice example. This sort of remark seems to be felt by some philosophers to be heartless wickedness, and yet it so screamingly self-evident that it is impossible to deny.
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