Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Properties' and 'Speaking of Objects'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
     Full Idea: Supervenience is sometimes taken to be a relationship between two fragments of language, but it is increasingly taken to be a relationship between pairs of families of properties.
     From: Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 7.17)
     A reaction: If supervenience is a feature of the world, rather than of our descriptions, then it cries out for explanation, just as any other regularities do. Personally I would have thought the best explanation of the supervenience of mind and body was obvious.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine]
     Full Idea: We are prone to talk about physical and abstract objects. It is hard to know how else to talk, because we are bound to adapt any alien pattern to our own in the very process of understanding or translating the alien sentences.
     From: Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], pt.I,p.1)
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
     Full Idea: Anti-realists theories of measurement (like operationalism) cannot explain how we can use different methods to measure the same thing (e.g. lengths and distances in cosmology, geology, histology and atomic physics).
     From: Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 4.2)
     A reaction: Swoyer says that the explanation is that measurement aims at objective properties, the same in each of these areas. Quite good.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
"No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia]
     Full Idea: Quine's well-known slogan "no entity without identity" means that no object should be admitted into our ontology unless its identity conditions, the conditions that say which object it is, have been settled.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960]) by Joseph Melia - Modality Ch.4
     A reaction: This invites science fiction scenarios, where we admit the existence of something before we have a clue what it is (whether it is physical, hallucination, divine..). Quine's slogan seems attractive but optimistic. How 'settled'?