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Ideas for 'reports', 'Wang's Paradox' and 'Naturalism in Mathematics'

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2 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The notion that things might actually be vague, as well as being vaguely described, is not properly intelligible.
     From: Michael Dummett (Wang's Paradox [1970], p.260)
     A reaction: It seems hard to disagree with this. It seems crazy that a pile of grain, or the hair on someone's head, are vague, and even quantum indeterminacies are not very well described as 'vague'. Vagueness is a very human concept.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy]
     Full Idea: The case of atoms makes it clear that the indispensable appearance of an entity in our best scientific theory is not generally enough to convince scientists that it is real.
     From: Penelope Maddy (Naturalism in Mathematics [1997], II.6)
     A reaction: She refers to the period between Dalton and Einstein, when theories were full of atoms, but there was strong reluctance to actually say that they existed, until the direct evidence was incontrovertable. Nice point.