display all the ideas for this combination of texts
8 ideas
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: We maintain that it is absolutely necessary that every entity might not exist. ...The absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: This is the main thesis of his book. The usual candidates for necessary existence are God, and mathematical objects. I am inclined to agree with Meillassoux. |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is necessary that there be something rather than nothing because it is necessarily contingent that there is something rather than something else. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3) | |
A reaction: The great charm of metaphysics is the array of serious answers to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. You'll need to read Meillassoux's book to understand this one. |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
Full Idea: It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'. | |
From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2) | |
A reaction: He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject. |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
Full Idea: Russell preceded Wittgenstein in deciding that the reduction of all propositions to atomic propositions could not be achieved. The problem cases were negative propositions, general propositions, and belief propositions. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.1 |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
Full Idea: The way to mean a fact is to assert it; the way to mean a simple is to name it. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.156) | |
A reaction: Thus logical atomism is a linguistic programme, of reducing our language to a foundation of pure names. The recent thought of McDowell and others is aimed at undermining any possibility of a 'simple' in perception. The myth of 'The Given'. |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
Full Idea: When I speak of 'simples' I am speaking of something not experienced as such, but known only inferentially as the limits of analysis. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.158) | |
A reaction: He claims that the simples are 'known', so he does not mean purely theoretical entities. They have something like the status of quarks in physics, whose existence is inferred from experience. |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
Full Idea: Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.161), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7 | |
A reaction: In 1919 he said that the alternative, of 'postulating' new entities, has 'all the advantages of theft over honest toil' [IMP p.71]. This is Russell's commitment to 'constructing' everything, even his concept of matter. Arithmetic as PA is postulation. |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
Full Idea: Since any proposition can be put into a form with a subject and a predicate, united by a copula, it is natural to infer that every fact consists in the possession of a quality by a substance, which seems to me a mistake. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.152) | |
A reaction: This disagrees with McGinn on facts (Idea 6075). I approve of this warning from Russell, which is a recognition that we can't just infer our metaphysics from our language. I think of this as the 'Frege Fallacy', which ensnared Quine and others. |