Combining Texts

Ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad' and 'Identity'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
19659 The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: We maintain that it is absolutely necessary that every entity might not exist. ...The absolute is the absolute impossibility of a necessary being.
     From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3)
     A reaction: This is the main thesis of his book. The usual candidates for necessary existence are God, and mathematical objects. I am inclined to agree with Meillassoux.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
19662 It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: It is necessary that there be something rather than nothing because it is necessarily contingent that there is something rather than something else.
     From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 3)
     A reaction: The great charm of metaphysics is the array of serious answers to the question of why there is something rather than nothing. You'll need to read Meillassoux's book to understand this one.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19654 We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: It is incumbent upon us to break with the ontological requisite of the moderns, according to which 'to be is to be a correlate'.
     From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 2)
     A reaction: He blames Kant for this pernicious idea, which has driven philosophy away from realist science, when it should be supporting and joining it. As a realist I agree, and find Meillassoux very illuminating on the subject.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
12695 Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber]
     Full Idea: The Epicurean atomists also defined body in terms of the property of being sensible, in order to distinguish it from empty space, which is not sensible.
     From: Daniel Garber (Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad [2009], 1)
     A reaction: This is a very illuminating bit of background, for those of us who have the knee-jerk reaction that monadology is barking mad.