Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Taking Rights Seriously', 'Thinking About Logic' and 'The Poverty of Philosophy'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Would a language without vagueness be usable at all? [Read]
     Full Idea: We must ask whether a language without vagueness would be usable at all.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Popper makes a similar remark somewhere, with which I heartily agreed. This is the idea of 'spreading the word' over the world, which seems the right way of understanding it.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluations say there is a cut-off somewhere, but at no particular place [Read]
     Full Idea: The supervaluation approach to vagueness is to construe vague predicates not as ones with fuzzy borderlines and no cut-off, but as having a cut-off somewhere, but in no particular place.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.7)
     A reaction: Presumably you narrow down the gap by supervaluation, then split the difference to get a definite value.
A 'supervaluation' gives a proposition consistent truth-value for classical assignments [Read]
     Full Idea: A 'supervaluation' says a proposition is true if it is true in all classical extensions of the original partial valuation. Thus 'A or not-A' has no valuation for an empty name, but if 'extended' to make A true or not-true, not-A always has opposite value.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5)
Identities and the Indiscernibility of Identicals don't work with supervaluations [Read]
     Full Idea: In supervaluations, the Law of Identity has no value for empty names, and remains so if extended. The Indiscernibility of Identicals also fails if extending it for non-denoting terms, where Fa comes out true and Fb false.
     From: Stephen Read (Thinking About Logic [1995], Ch.5)