display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
Full Idea: The analytic commitment of realism is that truths are grounded in the world. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Grounding') | |
A reaction: Certain fifth-level truths might be a long way from the actual world, and deeply interfused with human concepts and theories. Negative truths must be fitted into this picture. |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
Full Idea: Realism about a discourse is 1) to think that the sentences are, when construed literally, literally true or false, and 2) to think that some of the sentences of the discourse are non-vacuously true. | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [Cameron adds 'non-vacuously' to an idea of Sayre-McCord 199 p.5] This is realism based on what is 'true', without specifying 'commitments', so I like it. Cameron says it makes mathematical postulationists into realists. He likes 'mind-independent'. |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
Full Idea: All that is necessary for realism, I claim, is that truth is grounded in mind-independent features of fundamental reality. Truthmaker theory comes into play because it is a theory about what those features are (…so it isn't a commitment to realism). | |
From: Ross P. Cameron (Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology [2008], 'Realism') | |
A reaction: [He cites Michael Devitt for this approach] What is the word 'fundamental' doing here? Because the mind-dependent parts of reality are considered non-fundamental? The no-true-Scotsman-hates-whisky move? His truthmaking is committed to 'things'. |