Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Writing the Book of the World', 'Realism, Mathematics and Modality' and 'Induction'

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4 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
15017 Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider]
     Full Idea: Supervenience is just a kind of modal connection.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.10)
     A reaction: It says what would happen, as well as what does. This is big for Sider because he rejects modality as a feature of actuality. I think the world is crammed full of modal facts, so supervenience should be a handy tool for me.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / b. Types of fundamental
15008 Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider]
     Full Idea: The locus of fundamentality for a Finean is the whole proposition, whereas for me it is the proposition-part. Fundamentality is holistic for the Finean, atomistic for me.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.3)
     A reaction: This is because Kit Fine has pushed fundamentality into a relation (grounding), rather than into the particular entities involved (if I understand Sider's reading of him aright). My first intuition is to side with Sider. I'm on Sider's side...
15013 Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider]
     Full Idea: The existence of tables and chairs is just as fundamental as the existence of electrons (in contrast, perhaps, with smirks and shadows, which do not exist fundamentally). However, tables and chairs have nonfundamental natures.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 08.7)
     A reaction: This seems to be a good clarification, and to me the 'nature' of something points towards its essence. However, I suppose he refers here to the place of something in a dependence hierarchy. But then, why does it have that place? What power?
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
15014 Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
     Full Idea: Stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism, whereas things do not.
     From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 09.6.2)
     A reaction: [He cites Markosian 2004]