display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
20752 | For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett] |
Full Idea: Being consists not in what it is already, but in what it is not yet, a being that consists in not-yet-being. Everything else in the world is what it is….Man is the entity that makes himself….He has to determine what he is going to be. | |
From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.112,201-2), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 4 'Problem' | |
A reaction: [p.112 and 201-2] This seems to be Ortega y Gasset's spin on Heidegger's concept, by adding a temporal dimension to it. |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Supervenience is a stripped down form of reductionism, unencumbered by dubious denials of existence, claims of ontological priority, or claims of translatability. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
A reaction: Interesting. It implies that the honest reductionist (i.e. me) should begin by asserting supervience, and only at a second stage go on to deny a bit of existence, loudly affirm priorities, and offer translations. Honest toil. |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
Full Idea: A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div') | |
A reaction: Not everyone agrees on this. This says if either A or B change, the change is reflected in the other one. But the other view is of one-way dependence. A only changes if B changes, but B can also make changes that don't affect A. |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
Full Idea: Final definition of 'Materialism': Among worlds where no natural properties alien to our world are instantiated, no two differ without differing physically; and two such worlds that are exactly alike physically are duplicates. | |
From: David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Min Mat') | |
A reaction: This would presumably allow for an anomalous monist/property dualist view of mind, but not full dualism. But if there are no psychophysical laws, what stops the mental changing while the physical remains the same? |