23783
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Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE]
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Full Idea:
There is a phenomenon of change. I am starting with the assumptions that it is a causal phenomenon, and that it requires explanation.
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From:
Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 06.1)
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A reaction:
That is, I take it, that we need a theory which explains change, rather than just describing it. Well said. Williams says, roughly, that each stage causes the next stage.
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23790
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Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE]
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Full Idea:
Processes can be modelled in two ways. They are drawn out events encompassing many changes, but dissectible into short-lived states, none including change. Or they are continuous and impenetrable, and to split them is impossible.
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From:
Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 09.3)
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A reaction:
Obviously a process has temporal moments in it, so the unsplittability is conceptual. I find the concept of changeless parts baffling. But if processes are drawn out, they can't be basic to ontology.
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10502
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We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
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Full Idea:
I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things.
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From:
Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer.
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23773
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Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE]
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Full Idea:
The main components of neo-Humean metaphysics are that properties are inherently non-modal and passive, that what is possible is restricted only by imagination and coherence, that laws are non-governing descriptions, and causation is weak and extrinsic.
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From:
Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 02.1)
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A reaction:
This is Williams identifying the enemy, prior to offering the much more active and restictive powers ontology. I'm with Williams.
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