7949
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Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing.
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From:
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5
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A reaction:
We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap.
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6532
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Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
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Full Idea:
If types cannot be reduced to more physical levels, this is not an embarrassment, as long as our institutional categories, our physiological categories, and our physical categories are just alternative groupings of the same tokens.
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From:
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3)
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A reaction:
This is a self-evident truth about a car engine, so I don't see why it wouldn't apply equally to a brain. Lycan's identification of the type as the thing which cannot be reduced seems a promising explanation of much confusion among philosophers.
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6534
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One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
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Full Idea:
One space-time slice may be occupied by a collection of molecules, a metal strip, a key, an allower of entry to hotel rooms, a facilitator of adultery, and a destroyer souls.
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From:
William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 4.3)
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A reaction:
Desdemona's handkerchief is a nice example. This sort of remark seems to be felt by some philosophers to be heartless wickedness, and yet it so screamingly self-evident that it is impossible to deny.
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