Combining Texts

Ideas for 'works (fragments)', 'My Philosophical Development' and 'Vagueness, Truth and Logic'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


11 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Whatever participates in substance exists [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Zeno says that whatever participates in substance exists.
     From: report of Zeno (Citium) (fragments/reports [c.294 BCE]) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.05a
     A reaction: This seems Aristotelian, implying that only objects exist. Unformed stuff would not normally qualify as a 'substance'. So does mud exist? See the ideas of Henry Laycock.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
     Full Idea: In the years 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism.
     From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is interesting (about Russell) because he only labelled it as 'logical atomism' in about 1912, and only wrote about it as such in 1918. It is helpful to understand that the theory of definite descriptions was part of his logical atomism.
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
     Full Idea: I have come to think that, although many things can be known to be complex, nothing can be known to be simple.
     From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14)
     A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of his logical atomism. It goes with a general rebellion against foundationalist epistemology, because the empiricists foundations (e.g. Hume's impressions) seem devoid of all content.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
     Full Idea: Facts, as I am using the word, consist always of relations between parts of a whole or qualities of single things; facts, in a word, are whatever there is except what (if anything) is completely simple.
     From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.13)
     A reaction: This is the view that goes with Russell's 'logical atomism', where the 'completely simple' is used to build up the 'facts'. If World War One was a fact, was it a 'relation' or a 'quality'. Must events then be defined in terms of those two?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness is semantic, a deficiency of meaning [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: I take vagueness to be a semantic feature, a deficiency of meaning. It is to be distinguished from generality, undecidability, and ambiguity.
     From: Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
     A reaction: Sounds good. If we cut nature at the joints with our language, then nature is going to be too subtle and vast for our finite and gerrymandered language, and so it will break down in tricky situations. But maybe epistemology precedes semantics?
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
A thing might be vaguely vague, giving us higher-order vagueness [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: There is a possibility of 'higher-order vagueness'. The vague may be vague, or vaguely vague, and so on. If J has few hairs on his head than H, then he may be a borderline case of a borderline case.
     From: Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 5)
     A reaction: Such slim grey areas can also be characterised as those where you think he is definitely bald, but I am not so sure.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
A vague sentence is only true for all ways of making it completely precise [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: A vague sentence is (roughly stated) true if and only if it is true for all ways of making it completely precise (the 'super-truth theory').
     From: Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], Intro)
     A reaction: Intuitively this sounds quite promising. Personally I think we should focus on the 'proposition' rather than the 'sentence' (where fifteen sentences might be needed before we can agree on the one proposition).
Logical connectives cease to be truth-functional if vagueness is treated with three values [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: With a three-value approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&P is indefinite, but P&R is false, and P∨P is indefinite, but P∨R is true. This means the connectives & and ∨ are not truth-functional.
     From: Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 1)
     A reaction: The point is that there could then be no logic in any way classical for vague sentences and three truth values. A powerful point.
Meaning is both actual (determining instances) and potential (possibility of greater precision) [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: The meaning of an expression is the product of both its actual meaning (what helps determine its instances and counter-instances), and its potential meaning (the possibilities for making it more precise).
     From: Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 2)
     A reaction: A modal approach to meaning is gloriously original. Being quite a fan of real modalities (the possibilities latent in actuality), I find this intuitively appealing.
With the super-truth approach, the classical connectives continue to work [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: With the super-truth approach, if P is 'blob is pink' and R is 'blob is red', then P&R is false, and P∨R is true, since one of P and R is true and one is false in any complete and admissible specification. It encompasses all 'penumbral truths'.
     From: Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 3)
     A reaction: [See Idea 9767 for the super-truth approach, and Idea 9770 for a contrasting view] The approach, which seems quite appealing, is that we will in no circumstances give up basic classical logic, but we will make maximum concessions to vagueness.
Borderline cases must be under our control, as capable of greater precision [Fine,K]
     Full Idea: Any borderline case must be under our control, in the sense that it can be settled by making the predicates more precise.
     From: Kit Fine (Vagueness, Truth and Logic [1975], 3)
     A reaction: Sounds good. Consider an abstract concept like the equator. It is precise on a map of the world, but vague when you are in the middle of the tropics. But we can always form a committee to draw a (widish) line on the ground delineating it.