display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
15261 | Humeans can only explain change with continuity as successive replacement [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: Given the Humean ontology, there is grave difficulty in making any sense at all of the concept of change with continuity as distinct from successive replacements. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6. Intro) | |
A reaction: Hence the four-dimensionalist approach is basically Hume updated. The weird nature of time lurks behind this difficulty. If you can separate the moments of time, you can separate the bits of a continuous thing, and then ask how they relate. |
15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: On our view, 'event' is to be understood in terms of the ontology of enduring things, while on the Humean view enduring things are conceived to be constructions of events. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV) | |
A reaction: It has quite hard to take either objects or events, given that they seem to be amenable to analysis. I am tempted to take essences as primitive. They fix identity, endure change, bear accidental properties (including temporary intrinsics). |
15257 | The induction problem fades if you work with things, rather than with events [Harré/Madden] |
Full Idea: By a shift from events to things we claim to make the big problem of induction tractable. | |
From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 4.II) | |
A reaction: [You'll have to read their chapter to get the whole picture] The idea of basing a metaphysics on 'events' gives me the creeps, given the difficulty of individuating an event. Events are not primitive; even animals can analyse their components. |