display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 15300 | Fundamental particulars can't change [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: Fundamental particulars are incapable of change. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 8.IV) | |
| A reaction: I quote this in order to challenge it. If the proton can decay (which seems to be the case) maybe everything can. The fundamentals of a lawn mower eventually rust away; it may be thus with universe. What evidence could deny this? |
| 15319 | Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: There is no metaphysical justification whatever for treating the solid, bounded, material object as the determiner of all thing concepts. Fluids are no less material things than are hard solid blocks. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV) | |
| A reaction: We don't tend to talk of a fluid as 'a' thing, and without distinct objects there would be virtually no structure, or interest, in nature, so what gives identity to the blocks must interest the metaphysician. |
| 15320 | Magnetic and gravity fields can occupy the same place without merging [Harré/Madden] |
| Full Idea: The magnetic and the gravitation field can occupy all the same places without merging. | |
| From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.IV) | |
| A reaction: We can divide stuff into two classes, then, according to whether they usually merge if coextensive in space. Oil and water can be mixed, but eventually separate again. |