15318
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Gravitational and electrical fields are, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The region around a magnetic body, the space between earth and moon, and the vicinity of an electric cable remain obstinately and, for a materialist, distressingly empty of material.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 9.III)
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A reaction:
Ouch, if you are a strict 'materialist'! I call myself a 'naturalist', in a hand-wavy sort of way. On materialism and determinism I remain vague.
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15267
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Events are changes in states of affairs (which consist of structured particulars, with powers and relations) [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
A state of affairs consists of structures of particulars that endure (of which physical objects would be one type), the properties and powers of those particulars, and the relations obtaining among them. A common 'event' is a change in state of affairs.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
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A reaction:
I find 'event' to be so vague, and so dependent on pragmatic interests, that it has hard to find a place for it in an ontological system. Ditto with state of affairs. They overlap. States of affairs can survive change (like a political majority).
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23540
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Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
If 'P is red' and 'P is orange' are indefinite, then 'P is red and P is orange' seems false, because red and orange are exclusive. But if two conjoined indefinite sentences are false, that makes 'P is red and P is red' false, when it should be indefinite.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This is the problem of 'penumbral connection', where two indefinite values are still logically related, by excluding one another. Presumably 'P is red and P is of indefinite shape' can be true? Doubtful about this argument.
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23546
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Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
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Full Idea:
Standard notions of vagueness all accept borderline cases, and presuppose a higher standpoint from which a judgement of being borderline F, rather than simply being F or being not F, can be made.
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From:
Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3)
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A reaction:
He says that the concept of borderline cases is an impediment to understanding vagueness. Proposing a third group when you are struggling to separate two other groups doesn't seem helpful, come to think of it. Limbo cases.
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