Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Modes of Extension: comment on Fine' and 'The Possibility of Metaphysics'
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40 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
8321
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All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
568
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Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
12348
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There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin]
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11194
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Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
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11288
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Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle]
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15776
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There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle]
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611
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Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
11232
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Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis]
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11234
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The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis]
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11279
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Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
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11293
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Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
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11297
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Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
566
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If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle]
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16090
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Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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570
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Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle]
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12061
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The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle]
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10946
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Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle]
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16152
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Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle]
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11295
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There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis]
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13735
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Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
8300
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Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
16118
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Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle]
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8281
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Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
15768
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An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
8270
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Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
8308
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Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11154
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Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
12095
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Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
11256
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Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
8314
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Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
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8316
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Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
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8318
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The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
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8323
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It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
8313
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Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
8258
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Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
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8301
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Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
8283
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Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
8284
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The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
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13122
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Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]
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12347
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The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle]
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