Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Metaphysics', 'Predest.,God's foreknowledge and contingents' and 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness'
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39 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
568
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Some things exist as substances, others as properties of substances [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
12348
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There are four kinds of being: incidental, per se, potential and actual, and being as truth [Aristotle, by Wedin]
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11194
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Being is either what falls in the categories, or what makes propositions true [Aristotle, by Aquinas]
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11288
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Things are predicated of the basic thing, which isn't predicated of anything else [Aristotle]
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15776
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There is only being in a certain way, and without that way there is no being [Aristotle]
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611
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Being, taken simply as being, is the domain of philosophy [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
11232
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Primary being ('proté ousia') exists in virtue of itself, not in relation to other things [Aristotle, by Politis]
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11234
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The three main candidates for primary being are particular, universal and essence; essence is the answer [Aristotle, by Politis]
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11279
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Primary being is either universals, or the basis of predication, or essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
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11293
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Non-primary beings lack essence, or only have a derived essence [Aristotle, by Politis]
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11297
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Primary being is both the essence, and the subject of predication [Aristotle, by Politis]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
566
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If nothing exists except individuals, how can there be a science of infinity? [Aristotle]
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16090
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Being must be understood with reference to one primary sense - the being of substance [Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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570
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Nothing is added to a man's existence by saying he is 'one', or that 'he exists' [Aristotle]
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12061
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The primary subject seems to be substance, to the fullest extent [Aristotle]
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10946
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Existence requires thisness, as quantity or quality [Aristotle]
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16152
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Other types of being all depend on the being of substance [Aristotle]
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11295
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There is no being unless it is determinate and well-defined [Aristotle, by Politis]
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13735
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Aristotle discusses fundamental units of being, rather than existence questions [Aristotle, by Schaffer,J]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
16118
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Nature is an active principle of change, like potentiality, but it is intrinsic to things [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
15768
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An actuality is usually thought to be a process [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11154
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Prior things can exist without posterior things, but not vice versa [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
12095
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Knowledge of potential is universal and indefinite; of the actual it is definite and of individuals [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
11256
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Materialists cannot explain change [Aristotle, by Politis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9064
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Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
9044
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If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
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9048
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The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
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9055
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The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9049
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Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
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9056
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Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
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9058
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Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
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9059
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The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
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9060
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Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
9050
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A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
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9061
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People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
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9062
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If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
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9063
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How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
12347
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The immediate divisions of that which is are genera, each with its science [Aristotle]
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7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
16654
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Our words and concepts don't always correspond to what is out there [William of Ockham]
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