Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Confessions', 'Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr)' and 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
20 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
13221
|
Existence is either potential or actual [Aristotle]
|
16588
|
I prefer a lack of form to mean non-existence, than to think of some quasi-existence [Augustine]
|
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
16100
|
True change is in a thing's logos or its matter, not in its qualities [Aristotle]
|
16101
|
A change in qualities is mere alteration, not true change [Aristotle]
|
12133
|
If the substratum persists, it is 'alteration'; if it doesn't, it is 'coming-to-be' or 'passing-away' [Aristotle]
|
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
13213
|
All comings-to-be are passings-away, and vice versa [Aristotle]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
22979
|
Three main questions seem to be whether a thing is, what it is, and what sort it is [Augustine]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9064
|
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
9044
|
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
|
9048
|
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
|
9055
|
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
9049
|
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
|
9056
|
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
|
9058
|
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
|
9059
|
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
|
9060
|
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
9050
|
A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
|
9061
|
People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
|
9062
|
If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
|
9063
|
How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
|