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Ideas for
'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'Monadology' and 'Logical Atomism'
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11 ideas
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
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7644
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The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
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11857
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He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
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7843
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Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
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12751
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It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
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19363
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Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
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19352
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A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
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10968
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Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
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6113
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To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
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6114
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'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
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21722
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Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
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6111
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As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
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