Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Logical Properties', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'Can there be Vague Objects?'
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11 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
6070
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Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
6062
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Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn]
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6065
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We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
3990
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The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
3991
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Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
6082
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If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
6075
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Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
16129
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Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
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16459
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Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
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16460
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Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
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16457
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There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
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