Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'Can there be Vague Objects?' and 'Logic for Philosophy'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
16129 Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
16459 Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
16460 Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
16457 There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
13692 A 'precisification' of a trivalent interpretation reduces it to a bivalent interpretation [Sider]
13693 A 'supervaluation' assigns further Ts and Fs, if they have been assigned in every precisification [Sider]
13695 Supervaluational logic is classical, except when it adds the 'Definitely' operator [Sider]
13694 We can 'sharpen' vague terms, and then define truth as true-on-all-sharpenings [Sider]