Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Logical Atomism' and 'Philosophy of Mathematics'
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13 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
10279
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Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
229
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The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
21821
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Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
10968
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Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
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6113
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To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
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6114
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'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
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21722
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Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
10227
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The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro]
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10226
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Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
221
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Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
10262
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Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro]
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10277
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Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
6111
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As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
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