Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Deflating Existential Consequence' and 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness'
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22 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
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229
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The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
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21821
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Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
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12447
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That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
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221
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Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
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12445
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If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
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9064
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Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
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9044
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If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
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9048
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The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
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9055
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The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
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9049
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Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
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9056
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Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
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9058
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Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
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9059
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The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
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9060
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Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
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9050
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A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
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9061
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People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
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9062
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If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
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9063
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How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
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12449
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Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
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12440
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If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
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12438
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In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
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12441
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We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
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