Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology' and 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)'
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14 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
8643
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Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
229
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The one was and is and will be and was becoming and is becoming and will become [Plato]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
21821
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Plato's Parmenides has a three-part theory, of Primal One, a One-Many, and a One-and-Many [Plato, by Plotinus]
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7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
8911
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If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege]
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8634
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The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17443
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Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege]
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17445
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Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck]
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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
10539
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Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
221
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Absolute ideas, such as the Good and the Beautiful, cannot be known by us [Plato]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
17431
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Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
13879
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For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C]
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19485
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Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
19486
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We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
10642
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Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo]
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