Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Conceptions of Truth', 'Propositions' and 'Vagueness'

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22 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
21589 When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson]
21596 Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson]
21601 A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
21629 Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
21591 Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson]
21619 If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson]
21620 The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson]
21622 If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson]
9120 Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
21625 The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson]
21614 The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson]
21617 We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson]
21618 If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / e. Higher-order vagueness
21590 Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
21592 Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson]
21603 You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson]
21604 Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson]
21607 Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson]
21608 Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson]
21609 Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson]
21610 Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson]
21613 Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson]