Combining Texts
Ideas for
'', 'Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations)' and 'Every Thing Must Go'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
16 ideas
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
|
8643
|
Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege]
|
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
|
8911
|
If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege]
|
|
8634
|
The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege]
|
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
|
14948
|
To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14942
|
Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
|
14947
|
Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
|
17443
|
Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege]
|
|
17445
|
Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
|
14941
|
We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
|
10539
|
Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett]
|
|
10493
|
If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross]
|
|
14934
|
Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
|
14909
|
Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
|
17431
|
Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
|
13879
|
For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C]
|
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
|
10642
|
Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo]
|