Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Universe as We Find It' and 'Panpsychism'

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil]
     Full Idea: When a tomato depresses a scale, it does so in virtue of its mass - how it is masswise - and not in virtue of its colour or shape. Were we barred from saying such things, we would be unable to formulate truths about the fundamental things.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.3)
     A reaction: It doesn't follow that we have an ontological commitment to properties, but we certainly need to point out the obvious fact that things being one way rather than another makes a difference to what happens.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
     Full Idea: Categorical properties were introduced originally by philosophers bent on distinguishing properties possessed 'categorically', that is, actually, by objects from mere if-then, conditional properties, mere potentialities.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 04.3)
     A reaction: He cites Ryle on dispositions in support. It is questionable whether it is a clear or useful distinction. Heil says the new distinction foreclosed the older more active view of properties.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The supposition that a diamond or organism should truly have emergent properties is that they appear at certain complex levels of organisation, but are not explainable (even in principle) in terms of any more fundamental properties of the system.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Panpsychism [1979], p.186)
Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil]
     Full Idea: If you are going to have emergent fundamental properties, you are going to need emergent fundamental substances as bearers of those properties.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.6)
     A reaction: Presumably the theory of emergent properties (which I take to be nonsense, in its hardcore form) says that the substance is unchanged, but the property is new. Or else the bundle gives collective birth to a new member. Search me.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil]
     Full Idea: Only when you get to fundamental physics, do predicates begin to line up with properties.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 13.2)
     A reaction: A nice thought. I assume the actual properties of daily reality only connect to our predicates in very sloppy ways. I suppose our fundamental predicates have to converge on the actual properties, because the fog clears. Sort of.
In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil]
     Full Idea: It may be that F applies truly to a because F is a determinable predicate satisfied by a's possession of a property answering to a determinate of that determinable predicate.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.01)
     A reaction: Heil aims to break the commitment of predicates to the existence of properties. The point is that there is no property 'coloured' to correspond to 'a is coloured'. Red might be the determinate that does the job. Nice.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil]
     Full Idea: Properties are central to the universe's causal order in a way that sets could not possibly be.
     From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 02.3)
     A reaction: The idea that properties actually are sets is just ridiculous. It may be that you can treat them as sets and get by quite well. The sets can be subsumed into descriptions of causal processes (or something).